Early on 17 June 1972 five men were arrested inside the offices of the Democratic National Committee at the Watergate in Washington. A little over two years later, the President of the United States resigned.
Two microphones, hidden inside tubes of lip balm. They were taken from five men arrested inside the offices of the Democratic National Committee, at the Watergate in Washington, early on the morning of the seventeenth of June, nineteen seventy-two. A little over two years later, the President of the United States resigned. What brought him down was not the burglary.
It was a recording system of his own. In February nineteen seventy-one the Secret Service, at the President's request, had wired the Oval Office for sound: five microphones in his desk, one on each side of the fireplace, switching on whenever he walked into the room. Six days after the arrests, that system recorded his chief of staff proposing that the C I A be asked to tell the F B I to stay out of the case, and the President answering, all right, fine. Nine months later it recorded his own lawyer warning him of a cancer close to the presidency, and the President saying that a million dollars in cash could be found.
This film is made from those tapes, as they were played to juries in federal court, and from the transcripts the Watergate prosecutors typed from them.
The police caught them at about half past two in the morning, inside the committee's offices, with cameras, burglary tools and an electronic device. All five gave false names and would not say who they worked for. The F B I was first told they had been planting a bomb. It was a listening device, and the Bureau took the case.
The evidence from their trial is still in the National Archives: rubber gloves, lock picks, radio transmitters, cameras and film, and the address books they carried. Seven men were charged: the five arrested inside - Bernard Barker, Virgilio Gonzalez, Eugenio Martinez, James McCord and Frank Sturgis - and two more, E. Howard Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy.
In their hotel rooms were forty-four new one-hundred-dollar bills. Within five days the F B I had traced them to a bank in Miami where Barker had an account, and found what had been paid into it: eighty-nine thousand dollars in drafts on a bank in Mexico, and a cashier's check for twenty-five thousand dollars made out to a man named Kenneth Dahlberg. On the twenty-third of June, in the Oval Office, the President's chief of staff, H. R.
Haldeman, told him what the F B I had found, and how it could be stopped.
Haldeman: Mitchell came up with yesterday, and John Dean analyzed very carefully last night and concludes, concurs now with Mitchell's recommendation that the only way to solve this, and we're set up beautifully to do it, ah, in that and that ...the only network that paid any attention to it last night was NBC ...they did a massive story on the Cuban... President: That's right. Haldeman: thing. President: Right.
Haldeman: That the way to handle this now is for us to have Walters call Pat Gray and just say, "Stay the hell out of this ...this is ah, business here we don't want you to go any further on it.” That's not an unusual development,... President: Um huh. Haldeman: ...and, uh, that would take care of it. President: What about Pat Gray, ah, you mean he doesn't want to?
Haldeman: Pat does want to. He doesn't know how to, and he doesn't have, he doesn't have any basis for doing it. Given this, he will then have the basis. He'll call Mark Felt in, and the two of them ...and Mark Felt wants to cooperate because...
President: Yeah. Haldeman: he's ambitious President: Yeah'. Haldeman: Ah, he'll call him in and say, "We've got the signal from across the river to, to put the hold on this.” And that will fit rather well because the FBI agents who are working the case, at this point, feel that's what it is. This is CIA.
President: But they've traced the money to ‘em. Haldeman: Well they have, they've traced to a name, but they haven't gotten to the guy yet. President: Would it be somebody here? Haldeman: Ken Dahlberg.
President: Who the hell is Ken Dahlberg? Haldeman: He's ah, he gave $25,000 in Minnesota and ah, the check went directly in to this, to this guy Barker. President: Maybe he's a...bum. President: He didn't get this from the committee though, from Stans.
Haldeman: Yeah. It is. It is. It's directly traceable and there's some more through some Texas people in--that went to the Mexican bank which they can also trace to the Mexican bank ...they'll get their names today.
And (pause) President: Well, I mean, ah, there's no way I'm just thinking if they don't cooperate, what do they say? They they, they were approached by the Cubans. That's what Dahlberg has to say, the Texans too. Is that the-idea?
Haldeman: Well, if they will. But then we’re relying on more and more people all the time. That's the problem. And ah, they'll stop if we could, if we take this other step.
President: All right. Fine. Haldeman: and they seem to feel the thing to do is get them to stop? President: Right, fine.
Haldeman: They say the only way to do that is from White House instructions. And it's got to be to Helms and, ah, what's his name? Walters. President: Walters.
Haldeman: And the proposal would be that Ehrlichman (coughs) and I call them in President: All right, fine. Vernon Walters was the deputy director of the C I A. Patrick Gray was the acting director of the F B I. That afternoon Haldeman came back to report that the meeting with Walters had taken place.
The F B I's own summary of its investigation, written later, describes what happened next from the other side: two weeks of what it calls incredible backing and filling over whether interviewing Dahlberg would disrupt some C I A operation. We had no knowledge at that time, it says, of the discussions held at the White House.
Nobody outside the room knew that conversation had been recorded. It would be two years before anyone outside the White House heard it. In the meantime, the men who had been arrested were tried before Judge John Sirica in the federal court in Washington, and they wanted money. On the twenty-first of March, nineteen seventy-three, the Counsel to the President, John Dean, sat down in the Oval Office to tell the President where things stood.
Dean: let me give you my overall first. President: In other words, your, your judgment as to where it stands, and where we go now. Dean: I think, I think that, uh, there's no doubt about the seriousness of the problem we're, we've got. We have a cancer -- within -- close to the Presidency, that's growing.
It's growing daily. It's compounding, it grows geometrically now, because it compounds itself. Uh, that'll be clear as I explain, you know, some of the details, uh, of why it is, and it basically is because (1) we're being blackmailed; (2) uh, people are going to start perjuring themself very quickly that have not had to perjure themselves to protect other people and the like. And that is just -- And there is no assurance -- President: That it won't bust.
Dean: That that won't bust. President: How much money do you need? Dean: I would say these people are going to cost, uh, a million dollars over the next, uh, two years. President: We could get that.
Dean: Uh huh. President: You, on the money, if you need the,money, I mean, uh, you could get the money. Let’s say-- Dean: Well, I think that we're going President: What I meant is, you could, you could get a million dollars. And you could get it in cash.
I, I know where it could be gotten. Dean: Uh huh. President: I mean it's not easy, but it, could be done. But, uh, the question is who the hell would handle it?
The next afternoon, in his office in the Executive Office Building, the President talked it over with Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, John Mitchell and John Dean.
President: the one thing I don't want to do is to -- Now let me make this clear. I, I, I thought it was, uh, very, uh, very cruel thing as it turned out -- although at the time I had to tell [unintelligible] -- what happened to Adams. I don't want it to happen with Watergate -- the Watergate matter. I think he made a, made a mistake, but he shouldn't have been sacked, he shouldn't have been -- And, uh, for that reason, I am perfectly willing to -- I don't give a shit what happens.
I want you all to stonewall it, let them plead the Fifth Amendment, cover-up or anything else, if it'll save it -- save the plan. That's the whole point. On the other hand, uh, uh, I would prefer, as I said to you, that you do it the other way. It did not hold.
By April, Dean was talking to the prosecutors. On the thirtieth of April the President went on television. He announced that his chief of staff, Haldeman, his chief counselor for domestic affairs, John Ehrlichman, his counsel, John Dean, and his Attorney General were all resigning. Today, in one of the most difficult decisions of my presidency, I accepted the resignations of two of my closest associates in the White House, Bob Haldeman and John Ehrlichman, two of the finest public servants it has been my privilege to know.
I want to stress that in accepting these resignations, I mean to leave no implication, whatever, of personal wrongdoing on their part. In any organization, the man at the top must bear the responsibility. That responsibility, therefore, belongs here, in this office. I accept it.
That summer a Senate committee held public hearings. On the twenty-fifth of June Dean made his allegations before the committee. On the thirteenth of July, in a private interview with the committee's investigators, a former assistant to Haldeman, Alexander Butterfield, revealed that the White House had a taping system. Three days later he said it in public.
That was the last day the system ran.
Now everyone wanted the tapes. The Senate committee subpoenaed them; so did the Special Prosecutor, Archibald Cox. The President refused, citing executive privilege. The Court of Appeals ruled that the tapes had to go to Judge Sirica.
On the twentieth of October the President ordered his Attorney General to fire Cox. The Attorney General resigned rather than do it; so did the next in line. The third, Robert Bork, carried out the order. It became known as the Saturday Night Massacre.
A new Special Prosecutor, Leon Jaworski, was told that two of the tapes he wanted did not exist, and that another, from the twentieth of June, nineteen seventy-two, had a gap of eighteen and a half minutes. The President's secretary said she had erased part of it by accident.
On the first of March, nineteen seventy-four, a grand jury indicted seven men, for conspiracy to obstruct justice among other crimes, and named the President himself as an unindicted co-conspirator. Jaworski subpoenaed sixty-four more conversations. The President refused again, and the case went straight to the Supreme Court. It was argued on the eighth of July.
In these folders that you see over here on my left are more than 1,200 pages of transcripts of private conversations I participated in between September 15, 1972 and April 27 of 1973 with my principal aides and associates with regard to Watergate. Now enmeshed in almost 500 pages of briefs, when boiled down, this case really presents one fundamental issue. Who is to be the arbiter of what the Constitution says? Basically, this is not a novel question.
Sixteen days later the Court decided, eight to nothing. Chief Justice Warren Burger read the opinion from the bench. It cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice. The generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.
Accordingly, the judgment under review is affirmed. Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
Among the tapes the President now had to hand over was the twenty-third of June, nineteen seventy-two. Two weeks later, on the night of the eighth of August, he spoke to the country from the Oval Office. Therefore, I shall resign the presidency effective at noon tomorrow. Vice President Ford will be sworn in as President at that hour in this office.
The next morning he sent his letter of resignation to the Secretary of State, and Gerald Ford became President. A month later, Ford pardoned him. Congress then took the tapes out of his hands and gave them to the National Archives, and in nineteen seventy-eight it passed a law making every President's records the property of the United States.
About twelve hours of these conversations were played aloud in federal courtrooms during the Watergate trials, with the prosecutors' transcripts in the jurors' hands. They were the first of the Nixon tapes the National Archives released. What follows are the parts that tell the story, in the order the jury heard them. On screen is the prosecutors' transcript of what you are hearing.
Haldeman: They say the only way to do that is from White House instructions. And it's got to be to Helms and, ah, what's his name? Walters. President: Walters.
Haldeman: And the proposal would be that Ehrlichman (coughs) and I call them in President: All right, fine. Haldeman: and say, ah... President: How do you call him in, I mean you just, well, we protected Helms from one hell of a lot of things. Haldeman: That's what Ehrlichman says.
President: Of course, this is a, this is a Hunt, you will--that will uncover a lot of things. You open that scab there's a hell of a lot of things and that we just feel that it would be very detrimental to have this thing go any further. This involves these Cubans, Hunt, and a lot of hanky-panky that we have nothing to do with ourselves. Well what the hell, did Mitchell know about this thing to any much of a degree?
Haldeman: I think so. I don 't think he knew the details, but I think he knew. President: He didn't know how it was going to be handled though, with Dahlberg and the Texans and so forth? Well who was the asshole that did?
(Unintelligible) Is it Liddy? Is that the fellow? He must be a little nuts. Haldeman: He is.
President: I mean he just isn't well screwed on is he? Isn't that the problem? Haldeman: No, but he was under pressure, apparently, to get more information, and as he got more pressure, he pushed the people harder to move harder on President: Pressure from Mitchell? Haldeman: Apparently.
President: Oh, Mitchell, Mitchell was at the point that you made on this, that exactly what I need from you is on the-- Haldeman: (Unintelligible) President: All right, fine, I understand it all. We won't second-guess Mitchell and the rest. Thank God it wasn't Colson. President: he knows too damn much and he was involved, we happen to know that.
And that it gets out that the whole, this is all involved in the Cuban thing, that it's a fiasco, and it's going to make the FB, ah CIA look bad, it's going to make Hunt look bad, and it's likely to blow the whole, uh, Bay of Pigs thing which we think would be very unfortunate for CIA and for the country at this time, and for American foreign policy, and he just better tough it and lay it on them. Isn't that what you... Haldeman: Yeah, that's, that's the basis we'll do it on and just leave it at that. President: I don't want them to get any ideas we're doing it because our concern is political.
Haldeman: Right. President: And at the same time, I wouldn't tell them it is not political... Haldeman: Right. President: I would just say "Look, it's because of the Hunt involvement," just say (unintelligible, with noise) sort of thing, the whole cover is, uh, basically this (unintelligible).
Haldeman: (Unintelligible) Well they've got some pretty good ideas on this President: I didn't want him to read it in the papers. Good. Bye. (Hangs up telephone) Haldeman: (Unintelligible) President: (Unintelligible).
He said Haldeman: I think Helms did, too. Helms said well, uh, I've had no contact (unintelligible) and uh, Gray called and said, uh, yesterday, and said uh, that he thought President: Who had, Gray? Haldeman: Gray had called --Helm, s. which we knew, and said, uh, uh, I think we've run right into the middle of a CIA covert -operation.
President: Gray said that? Haldeman: Yeah, and Helms said "nothing, nothing we’ve got at this point" and uh, uh, Gray said, - "sure looks to me like that's what we did.” Some damn thing where he had -- (unintelligible). We can do about it -- this would require at all and, uh, that was the end of that conversation. You can fix it so (unintelligible) we don't, so (unintelligible) we don't think (unintelligible).
Said, well, the problem is that it tracks back to the Bay of Pigs. It tracks back to some other -- if their leads run out to people who had no involvement in this except by the contacts or connections, but it gets to areas that are at the (unintelligible) to be raised. The whole problem of this, this fellow Hunt, uh... So at that point Helms’s kind of got, the picture, kind of like the picture.
(unintelligible) ...he, he said, he said, "We'll be very happy to be helpful to, ah, you know, and we'll handle everything you want. I would like to know the reason for being helpful.” And it may have appeared when he wasn’t gonna get it explicitly but was gonna get it through generality. So he said fine, and uh, Walters. I don't know whether we can do it.
Walters said that. (Laughs) Walters is gonna make a call to Gray. (Unintelligible) that's the way we put it, that's the way it was left, and, uh, (unintelligible). President: How would that work though?
How would -- for example, if they're desperate (unintelligible) got somebody from Miami bank to be here to count the inventory. Haldeman: (Unintelligible) they can do that (unintelligible). Somebody (unintelligible). But, the point John made was the Bureau doesn't, the Bureau is going on.
That's because they don't know what they're uncovering. (Unintelligible) say should continue to pursue it, uh, they don't need to because they've already got their case as far as the, uh charges against these men, Dean: Three months ago I would have had trouble predicting where we'd be today. I think that I can say that fifty-four days from now that, uh, not a thing will come crashing down to our, our surprise. President: Say what?
Dean: Nothing is going to come crashing down to our surprise, either -- President: Well, the whole thing is a can of worms. As you know, a lot of this stuff went on. And, uh, and, uh, and the people who worked [unintelligible] awfully embarrassing. And, uh, and, the, uh, but the, but the way you, you've handled it, it seems to me, has been very skillful, because you --putting your fingers in the dikes every time that leaks have sprung here and sprung there.
[Unintelligible] having people straighten the [unintelligible]. The Grand Jury is dismissed now? Dean: That is correct. They'll, they will have completed and they will let them go, so there will no continued investigation prompted by the Grand Jury's inquiry.
The, uh, GAO report that was referred over to Justice is on a shelf right now because they have hundreds of violations. They've got violations of McGovern's; they've got violations of Humphrey's; they've got Jackson violations, and several hundred Congressional violations. They don't want to start prosecuting one any more than they want the other. So that's, uh -- President: They damn well not prosecute us unless they prosecute all the others.
Dean: That's right. That's right. Well, we are really talking about technical violations that were referred over also. President: Sure.
Sure. What about, uh, uh, watching the McGovern contributors and all that sort of thing? Dean: We've got a, we've got a hawk's eye on that. President: You need it very much.
I want it. Now, you were saying too, ah, what really, ah, where the, this thing leads, I mean in terms of the vulnerabilities and so forth. It's your view the vulnerables are basically Mitchell, Colson, Haldeman, indirectly, possibly directly, and of course, the second level is, as far as the White House is concerned, Chapin. Dean: And I'd say Dean, to a degree.
President: You? Why? Dean: Well, because I've been all over this thing like a blanket. President: I know, I know, but you know all about it, but you didn't you were in it after the deed was done.
Dean: That's correct that I have no foreknowledge... President: Here's the whole point, here's the whole point. My point is that your problem is you, you have no problem. All the others that have participated in the God-damned thing, and therefore are potentially subject to criminal liability.
You're not. That's the difference. Dean: That's right. (Pause) President: And on that score, of course, we have to know where we are.
President: Well, let me say this but coming back to the business about trying to get everybody up there and all the rest we've got to remember that what, what could be involved. Let's see. Let's see the whole view going up. (Unintelligible) Haldeman: It wasn't me and I don't think it has to be Dwight, but Dwight, Dwight I think may have to recant some of these (unintelligible) or explain them.
President: Yes, that's... Haldeman: ...some of what I said earlier. President: That's right. Well uh what I meant then might be an advantage.
Let's see. Oh, it's what, I mean, uh, maybe my reasoning is fallacious, but our real concern is Mitchell. (Noise) Maybe they're going to get him anyway. Haldeman: Well, John, at least the last I got into it in any detail, John Dean didn't think so.
President: They going to get -that right? Haldeman: See, John Dean's whole approach as I understand it- -this is when we went through it out in California for two full days (clears throat) what came out is his whole premise his, his basic approach to this is one of containment keep it in this box and he thinks he can. And that box goes on the theory that Liddy did it without authority from above and Liddy's been convicted of doing it. Liddy was the responsible guy at the campaign organization.
He's the highest guy that they've got. The other people were employees of Liddy's. Dean: That's right. Now.
The blackmail is continuing. Hunt called one of the lawyers from the Re-election Committee last Friday to meet with him on -- over the weekend. The guy came in to me, to see me to get a message directly from Hunt to me, for the first time. President: Is Hunt out on bail?
Dean: Pardon? President: Is Hunt on bail? Dean: Hunt is on bail. Correct.
Uh, Hunt now is demanding another seventy-two thousand dollars for his own personal expenses; another fifty thousand dollars to pay his attorneys' fees; a, hundred, and twenty, some thousand dollars. Wants it, wanted it by the close of business yesterday. ‘Cause he says, “I am going to be sentenced on Friday, and I've got to be able to get my financial affairs in order.” I told this fellow O'Brien, "You came -- all right, you came to the wrong man, fellow. I'm not involved in the money.
Uh, I don't know a thing about it, can't help you.” Said, “You better scramble around elsewhere.” Now; O’Brien is, O'Brien is, is a ball player. He's been, he's carried tremendous water for us. Uh President: He isn't Hunt's lawyer, is he? Dean: No he is, he is our lawyer at the Re-election Committee.
President: I see. Good. Dean: So he's safe. There's no problem there.
But it raises the whole question of Hunt now has made a direct threat against Ehrlichman, as a result of this. This is his blackmail. He says, "I will bring John Ehrlichman down to his knees and put him in jail. Uh, I have done enough seamy things for he and Krogh, uh, that they'll never survive it." President: What's that, on Ellsberg?
Dean: Ellsberg, and apparently, some other things. I don’t know the full extent of it. President: Well, another way, another way to do it then, Bob, is to and John realizes this--is to, uh, continue to try to cut our losses. Now we have to look at that course of action.
First, it is going to require approximately a million dollars to take care of the jackasses that are in jail. That could be, that could be arranged. Haldeman: or Dean: Yeah. President: That could be arranged.
But you realize that after we are gone, I mean, assuming these [unintelligible] are gone, they're going to crack, you know what I mean? And that'll be a unseemly story. Eventually, all the people aren't going to care that much. Dean: That's right.
It's-- President: People aren't going to care. Dean: So much history will pass between then and now. President: In other words, what we're talking about is no question. But the second thing is, we're not going to be able to deliver on, on any kind of a, of a clemency thing.
You know Colson has gone around on this clemency thing with Hunt and the rest. Dean: Hunt, Hunt is now talking in terms of being out by Christmas. Haldeman: This year? Dean: This year.
Uh, he was told by O'Brien, who is my conveyor of doom back and forth, Haldeman: Yeah. Dean: uh, that, uh, hell, he'd be lucky if he were out a year from now, after the Ervin hearings were, uh, you know, over. He said, "How in the Lord's name could you be commuted that quickly?” He said, "Well, that's my commitment from Colson." Haldeman: By Christmas of this year? Dean: Yeah.
Haldeman: See that, that really, that's very believable 'cause Colson, President: Do you think Colson could have told him -- Haldeman: Colson is an, is an—that’s, that's your fatal flaw, really, in Chuck, is he is an operator in expediency, and he will pay at the time and where he is President: Yeah. Haldeman: whatever he has toto accomplish what he's there to do. Dean: Right. Haldeman: And that's -- I, I would believe that he has made that commitment if Hunt says he has.
I would believe he is capable of saying that. President: The only thing you could do with him would be to parole him for a period of time because of his family situation. But you couldn't provide clemency. Dean: No, I--Uh, Kleindienst has now got control of the parole board, and he said that now we can, we can pull paroles off now where we couldn't before.
So-- President: Well, parole— Haldeman: Yeah, but Kleindienst always tells you that, and then never delivers. President: Parole, parole. Dean: Well, I mean -- President: Let's, let's talk candidly about that. Parole [unintelligible] in human terms, and so forth, is something that I think in Hunt's case, you could do Hunt, but you couldn't do the others.
You understand? Dean: Well, so much depends upon how Sirica sentences. He can sor--, sentence, sentence in a way that, uh, makes parole even impossible. Dean: But they do not ultimately solve what I see as the grave problem of a cancer growing around the Presidency, and that the cancer is going to continue to grow.
This is just another thing that gives a problem. It does not clean the problem out. Ehrlichman: Well, but doesn't it give, doesn't it permit the President to clean it out at such time as it does come up? By saying, "Indeed, I relied on it.
And now this, this later thing turns up, and I don't condone that. And if I'd known about that before, obviously, I wouldn't have done it. And I'm going to move on it now." President: Your point, John, is the, the -- You really think you've got to clean the cancer out now, right? Dean: Yes sir.
President: And, uh, how would you do that? You come back again for another round. You see no other, you see no other way that, uh, you, you, you -- without the, without setting a, without breaking down on executive privilege, of course. Dean: I see that, yeah, yeah, there are a couple of ways to do it.
President: You certainly don't want to do it at the Senate, though, do you? Dean: No sir. President: All right. Dean: I think that would be an added trap.
President: That's the, that's the worst thing. All right. Dean: Uh-- President: We've got to do it. Dean: We've got to do it.
You have to do it, to get the credit for it. Uh, that, that gets you above it. Uh, as I see it, that means people getting hurt, and I hope we can find the answer to that problem. President: The way I would, the way I was going to say about it, of course, on the money was (unintelligible).
First, what was it? The money was money that was, was collected without regard to the campaign laws at all... Haldeman: That's right. President: ...It was in cash.
It was for the purpose of taking polls and surveys, and so forth, prior to that, and so forth... Haldeman: That's right. President: ...It was not used. After the election it was a surplus...
Haldeman: That's right. President: ...It was turned back... Haldeman: That's right. President: ...Period.
Right? Haldeman: That's right. President: Now, what happened to it after that? Do we have to account for what happened to that money after the election?
Haldeman: Well-- President: If it was used to pay campaign bills-- Haldeman: Yeah. Somebody has to. We don't have to, but the campaign has to President: Somebody has to what, now? Haldeman: ...The campaign has to account for it.
President: But it wasn't collected in the cam-- Haldeman: But they still have to account for--it was, it was cash on hand at the time of the campaign. No it wasn't, 'cause they got rid of it President: Not in the campaign, not in the camp-- My point is, I would not treat that, I, that, in my view, was Haldeman: (unintelligible.) President: ...not campaign funds. That was campaign--that was not given for a campaign at all. These were funds that were, that were, shall we say, collected after the elections and had nothing to do with any campaign law, was not campaign funds, you know, for, for any purpose.
They wanted to know--what did they poll? They polled uh, what happened to Goldwater, what happened on the meat prices-- Haldeman: Yes sir. Issue, issue polls. President: Issue polls Haldeman: And the President: ...and the rest.
The study that you made... Haldeman: ...geographic analysis-- President: ...and after that they returned it over to the Campaign Committee. Haldeman: It was a gift to the Campaign Committee. President: Well I don't, I don't know.
Anyway, it's a problem, and that's--if Dean sees that, it's a problem because the question will be asked. Dean is very good this way. You saw how the next question would be, quack, quack, quack, quack. Haldeman: Well, it's a potential problem.
Haldeman: Uh, that Mitchell bought the idea that was cooked up in the White House for a super- intelligence operation, and that this was all set and an accomplished fact in December of `71 before Liddy was hired by the Committee. But then, Liddy was hired by the Committee to carry it out and that's why Dean sent Liddy over to the Committee. Then there was a hiatus. There were these meetings in Mitchell`s office, uh, where Liddy unveiled his plan.
And the first plan he unveiled, uh, nobody bought. They all laughed at it. Cause it was so bizarre So he went back to the drawing, board and came back with a second plan and the second plan didn`t get, bought either. That was at the second meeting and everything just kind of lingered around then.
It was sort of hanging fire. Liddy was pushing to get moving on his plans. And at that point, he went to Colson and said, “Nobody will approve any of this, uh, uh, and, you know, we could, we should be getting,… President: Yeah. Haldeman: ...getting going on it." And Colson then got into the act in pushing to get which, which started with the Colson phone call to Magruder saying, ”Well at least listen to these guys.” Then the final step was--all of this was rattlnig around in January.
The final step was when Gordon Strachan called Magruder and said Haldeman told him to get this going, “The President wants it done and there`s to be no more arguing about it.” This meaning the intelligence activity, the Liddy program. Magruder told Mitchell this, that Strachan had ordered him to get it going on Haldeman`s orders on the President's orders and Mitchell signed off on it. He said, “Okay, if they say to do it, go ahead.” President: Uh, was that this is the bugging? Haldeman: The whole thing including the bugging.
Ehrlichman: I've been concerned because since the end of March, I have turned up a fair amount of -hearsay evidence that, that points at this guy. Now, just take President: And so did Dean... Ehrlichman: And, and so did John. President: ...so did Dean.
Ehrlichman: Now, taking this President: Yet we've tried, very honestly, we've tried to, tried to look at it the best way we could. Maybe he couldn't, maybe he really didn't know. Ehrlichman: Well, it's hearsay. And so, he...
President: That point. Ehrlichman: ...you don't hang a guy, you don't hang a guy necessarily President: And also, we are going to remember, Mitchell has denied it. Ehrlichman: But I was, I st-, stood over there in Bob's office and listened to that tape of one of the co-actors saying, flat out on the tape, that he-was guilty -and that Mitchell was gonna, was going to fall and all that and I said to President: Did he say that? Did he say that?
Ehrlichman: ...and, and I said to myself, "My God ! I'm a, you know, I mean, I'm a United States citizen. I'm standing here listening to this, what is my duty?" President: Well the point is you've now told me. That's the problem.
Ehrlichman: That's correct, that's correct. President: You see, the differ uh, uh, the uh, the problem of my position up to this time has been, quite frankly, nobody ever told me a God-damn thing... Ehrlichman: That's right. President: ...that Mitchell was guilty Ehrlichman: That's right.
President: I mean, uh -- Haldeman: Well, we still don't know. President: I, I... Haldeman: I don't... President: must say-- Haldeman: I, I will still argue that I think the scenario that was spilled, uh, spin, spun out, that Dean spun out to Mitchell is basically the right one.
... President: Yeah. Haldeman: ...I don't think Mitchell did order the Watergate bugging and I don't think he was specifically aware of the Watergate bugging at the time it was instituted. President: Well, let me -- Haldeman: I honestly don't.
Ehrlichman: He's exactly the kind of guy we need. Now, I don't know how he, he is in person -he hasn't practiced law for a long time. That's not, that's not an immediate drawback but, but, *uh President: He has the lawyer's mind. Ehrlichman: ...you got to get him somebody to help him, like, uh, uh -- Haldeman: Haven't though, haven't events overtaken that project?
President: Oh, no. No. No. No.
No. Bob, for Christ's sake, will you -look, the point that I make is let's suppose they get Mitchell. Then they're going to say now what about Haldeman and what about Chapin, and what about Colson and the rest? I've got to have a report indicating -in other words, you've got all that whole Segretti crap in there.
I want somebody to say, now look, here are the facts. None of the White House people were involved. There are no other higher-ups. The White House was not involved.
Put a cap around it. And, and second... Ehrlichman: More than that President: ...and then face the Segretti crap. Ehrlichman: I, I, in, in forcing this out, Dean remains a problem and, and, uh, here's -uh, let me just read you what I've come to on that...
President: Alright. Ehrlichman: "John Dean has not involved himself in this matter as your counsel for several months and properly so. I should not continue to fill in for him," meaning me, "for several reasons, including the impermissable demands on my time that are involved. You need a full-time special counsel to follow these related problems who can advise you of the legal niceties from his experience in constitutional, criminal and governmental practice.
I'll be happy to continue to consult with him, and soon. I do not recommend that Dean take a leave. That is neither in nor out. He has involved himself to the extent described above.
Either that requires dismissal or it does not. And that choice should be made at once. If he is discharged, the U.S. Attorney and the Grand Jury should treat him differently.
But I think he's, he -you've got to bite the bullet on Dean, one way or the other, pretty quick. President: Alright. But... Ehrlichman: But recognize, uh, Haldeman: What did Dean say to...
Ehrlichman: ...but recognize... Haldeman: ...what did Dean say to... Ehrlichman: that kills him. Haldeman: Dean's.
Ehrlichman: Well, I'm not sure that's the right decision. It's uh, uh, uh, by, by framing the issue, I;:.doh`t mean to imply that... President: Oh, I see. Ehrlichman: ...that's the (unintelligible).
President: I thought, no, no, I thought... Ehrlichman: Uh, (unintelligible) President: When, when you said you didn't address it, I, I'm sorry, I thought that was one of the recommendations you had made. Ehrlichman: No, no, my recommendation is that you recognize that, there's a go-no go decision that has to be... President: Oh, I see.
Ehrlichman: ...made right away. President: Oh, alright, yeah. Ehrlichman: You see, here's your situation as I--Look again-the big picture--You now are possessed of a,body of fact. President: That's right.
Ehrlichman: And you've got to, you can't just sit here. President: That's right. Ehrlichman: You've got to act on it. President: Right.
Ehrlichman: ...You've got to make some, you got to make some decisions and the Dean thing is one of the decisions that you have to make. Now you may decide President: [on telephone] Bull, please. Steve Bull. [To Ehrlichman] (unintelligible) Alright, fine, John.
Ehrlichman: Eh, eh-- President: ...Then you're not... Ehrlichman: Then you've got to dispose of it one way or the other. Uh, uh, there may be and, and, I'm, I’m-- (Phone rings) [on telephone] President: Yeah, put the, uh, that, uh, thing with, uh, uh, Haig, uh, back. What time you got now?
Quarter after (Hangs I'll be there a few minutes late at the EOB. [Hangs up telephone] Ehrlichman: I'll tell you, I am still heavily persuaded,"that we affect the Grand Jury and U.S. Attorney,treatment of Dean favorably by keeping him on. President: Okay.
Ehrlichman: Uh, and that that's important. Now-- President: Why, why, do you say that? Because they like him? Ehrlichman: No, no, not at all.
Haldeman: Because they can treat him differently as the President's counsel than-- Ehrlichman: As the dismissed President's counsel Haldeman: Exactly. President: Yeah. Ehrlichman: it's just that it's a very heavy psychological factor. President: Well, this will be done, because there is another reason?
too. It isn't like, it--Dean is not like Mitchell, now let's face it. Haldeman: That's right. President: Dean is not like Mitchell in the sense that Dean only tried to do what he could to pick up the Goddamn pieces and...
Haldeman: Certainly. President: ...everybody else around here knew it had to be done. Ehrlichman: Certainly. President: Uh, let's face it.
I'm not blaming anybody else how. Haldeman: I understand. President: That was his job. Haldeman: I understand.
Ehrlichman: I have, I have great trouble in (unintelligible) that you could be involved in the light of the known involvement that he had... President: After the? Ehrlichman: ...in the aftermath. President: Right, but-- Ehrlichman: But-- Haldeman: The known involvement in the aftermath was for, uh, what was understood here to be the proper (unintelligible) Ehrlichman: That's half-- President: The question is motive.
Haldeman: That's right. Ehrlichman: That's number one. Number two, there is nothing new about that. President: That's right.
Ehrlichman: As I have developed, in this thing--I'd like you to read this. President: Yeah. Ehrlichman: There were eight or ten people around here who knew about this, knew it was going on. President: Yeah.
Ehrlichman: Bob knew, I knew, all kinds of people knew. President: Well, I knew it. I knew it. Ehrlichman: And it was not a question of whether-- President: (Unintelligible) I knew I must say though, I didn't know it, but I must have assumed it though, but you know, fortunately--and I thank you both for arranging it that way and it does show why the isolation of the President, isn't a a bad position to be in.
Ehrlichman: (Laughs) President: But the first time that I knew that they had to have the money was the time when, uh, Dean told me that they needed forty thousand dollars. I hadn't been rege-, I didn't, I just didn't, I closed my eyes, I couldn't read the Goddamn papers on those little envelopes. I didn't know about the envelopes and the (unintelligible) and all that stuff. Ehrlichman: Well, the, the...
President: But others did know. Ehrlichman: ...the point is that, that if Dean's, if the wrongdoing which justifies Dean's dismissal is his knowledge that that operation was going on... President: Yeah. Ehrlichman: ...then you can't stop with him.
You've got to go through the whole place wholesale. President: Fire the whole staff, Ehrlichman: That's right. It's, it's a question of motive. Ehrlichman: This all starts back in September of 71, when Dean, Caulfield and Magruder,--ah, met and contrived an intelligence effort called Sandwedge.
Too much, months later, ah, Dean had been unable to find the right people to make that thing work.--and Dean had approved of Liddy. And later ah, Dean, Liddy and Magruder met. Liddy, after-having some contact with Dean, and Magruder is a little vague on (unintelligible) forward with a million-dollar proposal. Magruder says that Dean says that a million dollars was the right figure.
And that’s why he picked that figure.--Budgets and so the four of them met. They went over it and Mitchell rejected it. A week later, Liddy came back with a budget half as big, the half-million dollar budget. And that was also rejected-- President: By Mitchell?
Ehrlichman: By Mitchell. Dean went on and said "These kinds of things shouldn't even be run by Mitchell. He's Attorney General of the United States. He is sitting over herein his parochial office and he shouldn't even—“ Ehrlichman: Liddy and Magruder then went on to try and develop a satistactory project proposal.
President: A quarter Ehrlichman: A quarter million dollar level. Magruder said he was never satisfied with it. He kept sending Liddy back to the drawing boards. Finally, Colson called, with Liddy and Hunt in his office (unintelligible-tape noise) vigorously.
Finally, although he, and he felt Mitchell, too, were nervous about it and didn't feel comfortable about it, he said, "Well all right, I'll start this moving." President: (Tape noise) he doesn’t say that Colson chewed him out? Specifically about this proposal? Ehrlichman: He said, Gordon Liddy's projects. He did not say wire taps.
He used the word "projects." In fact, there was indeed a budget for this quarter million dollar proposal. It was in writing. A copy of it had been furnished to Gordon Strachan. And it was very specific, in terms of the kind of equipment to be used.
President: It was furnished to Strachan? Ehrlichman: Yes sir. Ehrlichman: That's right. That's right.
You take a fellow like Shumway over there for instance... President: Yeah. Ehrlichman: ... uh, who has to think about the PR of the campaign.
President: Making statements. Well, for example, it's the, it's like in the very tangential, and it's only tangentially that it touches you and Bob, uh, you know what I mean, that somebody came to you. Ehrlichman: Yeah. President: Good God, I mean you said go talk to Kalmbach.
If you were talking about keeping (unintelligible) if you knew the defendants were guilty, and if you didn't know who the hell else was. Ehrlichman: That's correct. President: And you just thought that they were sure of Hunt. Ehrlichman: Well, you know, the thing that ran through my mind...
President: Yeah. Ehrlichman: was Howard Hunt has written books... President: Yeah. Ehrlichman: ...
and Howard Hunt was worried about the support of his family. And I could see Howard Hunt writing an inside expose of how he broke into the Democratic National Headquarters at the request of the Committee to Re-elect the President. President: Yeah. Ehrlichman: Now, if I had a choice between getting contributions for the support of Howard Hunt's family...
President: Yeah. And that's Ehrlichman: ...and that was pretty easy. President: And I suppose they would say though, that, uh Ehrlichman: Oh, I didn't care what Howard Hunt said to the Prosecutor. He could've said anything he wanted to the Prosecutor in a secret, in a secret session.
That didn't hurt us. President: It was all secret then. Ehrlichman: The Grand Jury was secret. President: The Grand Jury was ill operative at that time.
Ehrlichman: Sure. President: It hadn't come to trial? Ehrlichman: Sure, it didn't come to trial until after the election. President: Yeah.
That's what I see. Ehrlichman: So, uh. President: I think John wasn't, it was, the, nobody was trying to keep him from telling the truth to the Grand Jury, to shut him up to the Grand Jury. Ehrlichman: I can, I can say in truth and candor that Dean never explained to me that there was any kind of a deal to get these guys to lie or to change their stories or to refuse to testify to the, to the, uh trial of the action or anything of that kind.
That was just never discussed. So, I don't feel too uncomfortable with this. President: So at least his line on that is that he didn’t know about it before, prior knowledge. Ehrlichman: OK.
President: Only one point that, uh, occurs to me that uh, that, uh, he did discuss with me the, this need, for funds for Hunt. At least I remember the... Haldeman: Yeah. President: Did he come in, who did he discuss that with, (unintelligible) that Hunt needed attorney fees.
Haldeman: (Unintelligible) Ehrlichman: Did he do that to you personally? President: Yeah. He discussed it and asked about it. I said I President: don’t know whether you can get it.
I, I, I, (Continued) I didn't but, but what I meant is that it was so, uh -- Ehrlichman: Well, you know what I was telling him at the sa-, at that time,... President: Uh huhm. Ehrlichman: ...was that that should not be a consideration in this thing. President: Uh humm.
Ehrlichman: And you know... President: And then they went back and, and so Mitchell took care of it, I mean, ah... Ehrlichman: Yeah, but not on, not on account of any jeopardy to me obviously. President: Dean -Huh?
Ehrlichman: Not on account of any jeopardy to me. I mean he did that for his own purposes. President: Yeah. Mitchell.
Ehrlichman: Yeah. Because I was saying look fellows if, if that’s the only thing he’s doing, is blackmailing me, why forget it, you know. President: Wait, wait, Hunt sent a message to you. I didn’t know about that.
Ehrlichman: No, he didn't send it to me. He sent it to, to Dean about me. President: I didn’t know that. Ehrlichman: Yeah.
President: What did he say I'm gonna talk about Ehrlichman? (unintelligible) Ehrlichman: Yeah. President: He’s referring of course to the things that were done before. Ehrlichman: Sure.
Haldeman: He said, I, I'm gonna pull the plug on all the dirty stuff. Ehrlichman: Yeah. Haldeman: He also said something about that. President: And you said it'd cost a million dollars.
Dean: I said, "It," you know, "it conceivably could, and the way this," I said, "If we don't cut this thing—“ President: Exactly. Dean: Uh, anyway -- President: But that's the only conversation we had. Where -How was that handled? Who the hell handled that, that money?
Dean: Uh, well, let me tell you the rest -what, what Hunt said. He said, "You tell Dean that I need seventy-two thousand dollars for my personal expenses, fifty thousand dollars for my legal fees.” President: Uh huh. Dean: "If I don't get it, I'm going to have some things to say about the seamy things I did at the White House for John Ehrlichman.” President: Uh huh. Dean: All right.
I took that to Ehrlichman. Ehrlichman said, uh, "Have you talked to Mitchell about it?” I said, "No, I have not.” Uh, he said, "Well, will you talk to Mitchell?” I said, "Yes, I will.” I talked to Mitchell. I just passed it along to him. And then there was a meeting down here a few days later in, in Bob"s office with Bob and Ehrlichman and Mitchell and myself.
And, uh, Ehrlichman said at that time, he said, "Well is that problem with Hunt straightened out?” He said it to me and I said, "Well, ask the man who may know: Mitchell.” And Mitchell said, "I think that problem is solved.” President: That’s all? Dean: That's all he said. President: Right. That’s good.
In other words, that was done at the Mitchell level? Dean: That's right. President: But, you had knowledge; Haldeman had a lot of knowledge; and Ehrlichman had knowledge. Dean: Right.
President: And I suppose I did. I mean, I am planning to assume some culpability on that [unintelligible] Dean: I don't think so. President: Why not? Dean: Uh -- President: I plan to be tough on myself as I am on the other thing, though, I, must say I didn't really give it a thought at the time because I didn't know, uh -- Dean: No one gave it a thought.
President: You did. You did. Dean: No one -- President: You didn't tell me this about Ehrlichman, for example. When you came in on that day Dean: I know.
President: you simply said, "Hunt needs this money.” And you were using it as an example of the problems ahead. Dean: I, I have tried, uh, all along to make sure that anything I passed to you myself didn't cause you any personal problems. Haldeman: Well, it works out very good. We had that, that, oh, you became aware sometime ago that this thing did, did not parse out the way it was supposed to and that there were some discrepancies between what you had been told by Dean in the report that there was nobody in the White House involved, which may still be true.
President: Let me say that, I don’t want to...I don't think it, it is gaining us anything by pissing on the Dean Report as such. Ehrlichman: No. President: What I mean is I would say that I was not satisfied that the Dean Report was, was complete, uh, and I also, I felt that I ought to, I ought to go--it was my obligation to go beyond that to people other than the White House. Ehrlichman: Well, Ran has an interesting point.
Remember you had John Dean go to Camp David... President: I know... Ehrlichman: ...and write it up, and he came down and said, "I can’t. President: Right.
Ehrlichman: That's the tip off and right then you started to move. President: That's right. He said he could not, could not write it. Haldeman: Then you realized there was, there was more to this...
President: Right. Haldeman: ...then you had been led to believe. (Unintelligible) President: Then how do I get credit for getting Magruder to the stand? Ehrlichman: Well, I, uh, it is very simple.
You took Dean off the case right then--two weeks ago... President: That's right. Ehrlichman: ...the end of March. (Unintelligible) Ehrlichman: The end of March.
Remember that letter you signed to me? President: Uh, huh. Ehrlichman: 30th of March. President: I signed it to you?
Yes. Ehrlichman: Yes sir, and it says, "Dean’s off of it. I want you to get into it. Find out what the facts are.
Be prepared to--" President: Why did I take Dean off? Because he... Ehrlichman: Because he was involved. President: ...he became involved: I did it, really, because he was involved with Gray.
Ehrlichman: Well there was a lot of stuff breaking in the papers, but at the same time... Haldeman: The scenario is that he told you he couldn't write a report so obviously you had to take him off. President: Right, right. Haldeman: Dean did tell us that story up in Ehrlichman's office last week or two weeks ago.
President: But not to go through this? Haldeman: I don't think so. President: Yeah. Haldeman: I think I mentioned it to you, remember.
I described the story to you in some detail when he walked down 17th Street-- President: No. This was all after we had started our own investigation. Haldeman: Oh, yeah. President: I mean, it wasn't back then.
It wouldn't indicate that we knew about all this, and so forth. Another thing. (unintelligible) Haldeman: And also (unintelligible) John Dean (unintelligible) President: John, and you get, uh, sit down and do some hard thinking about what kind of strategy you are going to have with the money. You know what I mean.
Haldeman: Yeah. President: That's got to be something perhaps better than say, well, either one of the defendants can talk to the press and I don't, what in the hell the strategy is I think you ought to talk about that, but, uh, I'm a little concerned about the last bite or two, the one twenty-seven don't know who, who talked about that one, but, uh, to Hunt, Hunt's lawyer. Haldeman: Oh. President: Who's, who was the one that made that original-- Haldeman: Dean.
Bittman dealing directly to Dean on that. President: Right. Right. Then Dean came in and asked us, and what happened?
Haldeman: We said we didn't know what to do about it, and we said that's, you know, that's something that, that obviously Mitchell should be taking care of. President: Yeah. Well, in any case, taking care of. Haldeman: And, and then they, President: But...
Haldeman: ... indicated in the meeting with us President: Yeah Haldeman: ...the next day (unintelligible) President: (Unintelligible). On the other hand, that, of course, indicates knowledge and so forth. Haldeman: That's right.
President: Uh, look, you've got to call Kalmbach so I want to be sure. I've been trying to try to find out President: I don't know how that, why it was at that point that we were still working on money for Hunt, what, what was it we were, I don't know how the hell (unintelligible). Haldeman: That was the, that was the one that, that Bittman got to Dean on... President: Yeah, Dean told...
Haldeman: ...directly. And that he really panicked on it. He was very concerned. President: He came in and told me.
Haldeman: ...professed to be concerned because Bittman’s threat was that Hunt said that "If you don’t get it to me, I'm going to tell them all about, all about the seamy things I did for Ehrlichman and when Dean...” President: That's right. Haldeman: And when Dean hit Ehrlichman on that, Ehrlichman's immediate reaction was let him go ahead, I have, there's nothing he can hang me on. President: That’s right. Haldeman: Dean didn't want that answer, and went, went on worrying about the money.
President: Told me about it. Haldeman: Told you about it, told me about it and the whole point, I was in here when he told you. President: Well, ah, good. What, what did we say?
Remember he said, "How much is it going to cost to keep these three guys?” He said, "A million dollars.” I just shook my head. Haldeman: Then we got into the question, if there's, if there's blackmail here, then we're into a thing that's... President: All right. Haldeman: ...just ridiculous and he said, he raised the point.
Now my feeling on that point remember that, that, Jesus, you can't say it's a million dollars. It may be million dollars. President: That's right Haldeman: Once we get into that. President: That's right, that's right.
Haldeman: And that we... President: ought to... Haldeman: That we ought not to be in this and then we left it, you know, we can't do anything about it anyway. We don't have any money, and ah, it isn't a question to be directed here.
This is something, relates to Mitchell's problem. Ehrlichman has no problem with the thing with Hunt. And Ehrlichman said; “Christ, if you're going to get into blackmail, the hell with it." President: Good. The word blackmail, thank God you were in there when it happened, but you remember the conversation.
Haldeman: Yes, sir. President: I didn't tell him to go get the money, did I? Haldeman: No. President: No you didn't, you didn't either, did you?
Haldeman: Absolutely not. I said, "You've got to talk to Mitchell, this is something you got to work out with Mitchell, not here, there's nothing we can do about it here." Ehrlichman: Well, as I said... President: That goddamn Dean. Ehrlichman: As I said this morning, I think you can very truthfully and logically and properly say that...
President: I was trying to bury, I was trying, I was really trying to probe his thought processes. I went down every road we possibly could... Ehrlichman: Exactly right. President: and see where we were.
Ehrlichman: And it paid off. You see, you're the one who then came back and said, "I've go to have that all written down. Send that man to Camp David if necessary and have him take as much time as necessary and let's get it all down." That's when he was uncovered. President: I suppose that really isn't true.
Ehrlichman: Well... President: Not that he was uncovered, it was simply the fact that he said, "By God, this thing is such a cancer and so forth, that I can't write it and there's no way we make a statement," and I said to you, John, "You better get into it.” Take Ehrlichman: Yes, but I happen to be... President: Well... Ehrlichman: This may be some measure of hindsight, but I really don't think it is because my very conscious contemporary reaction when Dean came back and didn't have anything for us, was, whoops, there's something more here, because Dean could have constructed some kind of an artful ah, ah, evasion if he hadn't been so pervasively involved.
Ehrlichman: …I think it's entirely conceivable that if Dean is totally out of control and if matters are not handled adroitly that you could get a resolution of impeachment… President: That's right. Ehrlichman: …in the Senate… President: That’s right. Ehrlichman: …I don't know if you've thought of this or not, but I got thinking about it last night. Uh, on the ground that you committed a crime.
President: Right. Ehrlichman: Uh, and that there is no other legal process available to, uh, uh, the United States people, other than… President: Right. Ehrlichman: …other than impeachment. Otherwise, you have immunity from prosecution.
President: Right. Ehrlichman: Uh, so I think we have to, I think we have to think about that. We have to (unintelligible)… President: Right. Ehrlichman: …and see about, see what the point is, is it a crime, if any, and uh, how serious it is, and would Dean, is a threat, and what we do about it.
Uh, my own analysis is that what he has falls far short of any commission of a crime by you. So far as know. President: Yeah. Ehrlichman: I don't know what you may have talked about with him in those ten or twelve hours you and he spent there in the months, months of February and March.
President: Right. Ehrlichman: Uh, but, uh, you get down to a point where you've got John Dean prancing in there and saying, "The President said this and the President said that," and having somebody in your behalf come back and say, "No, the President didn't say that, and Ehrlichman: that's ridiculous.” Uh, and., and., so you get (cont.) a kind of credibility thing unless., like he seems to be doing., he's very busy, uh, dredging up corroborating evidence and looking for documentation or taking statements from people based on leads that may have developed from those conversations. And I think really the only way that I know to make a judgement on this is for you to listen to your tapes and see what actually was said then, or maybe for Bob to do it, or, or, somebody. See what was said there.
And then analyze how big a threat that is. President: Right. Ehrlichman: If it didn't come out of those meetings, then I think it's imaginary. Haldeman: Dean said, "The reason for this meeting this morning, is that you don't really know what I know, so it's difficult for you to make judgments.
And, uh, he said, "Overall there's-no doubt about the seriousness of all this. There's a cancer close to the Presidency. It's growing daily; it's compounding itself. We’re being blackmailed.
People are going to start perjuring to protect others and there's no assurance it isn’t all gonna bust. And, let's face it. First, let me fill you in on the Watergate.” Then he went back to the beginning, went through the whole thing on how it came about. President: Right.
Haldeman: It. doesn’t matter. Put the pieces together (unintelligible) the information (unintelligible with tape noise) aware of any, of it, until, uh, afterwards. You don t know how much knowledge Mitchell had.
President: I asked him how much knowledge (unintelligible). Haldeman: Yeah. (Unintelligible with tape noise) himself. That, uh,--“I honestly believe no one over here knew." And you asked about Bob.
He said, "I don't believe Bob knew specifically. I think Strachan did know. Bob knew there was a capacity.” He says, (unintelligible with tape noise) seventeenth he says, "I was under instructions, under their instructions not to investigate. We worked on the theory of containment.
We knew everything the FBI did and everything the Grand Jury did and I have-Petersen’s a soldier, he kept me informed of the leads (unintelligible) in this Administration. He made-sure the investigation was narrowed and there was nothing improper-about it, and they ran out each lead to the fullest extent and they kept" (unintelligible) But you said, "Why didn’t they call Haldeman?” Dean said, "There was no reason for calling-him," he, said. He said, "Strachan appeared, as a result of coaching, to be the dumbest guy on the Committee.” That's Gordon Strachan. (Tape noise) -"the demands for attorneys’ fees.
You're asking us, to take this, uh, through the election, so, uh, you gotta have money to take care of other kinds and all that. So arrangements were made through Mitchell and I was present. I, Dean was present. They had to be taken care of and their needs done and all that (unintelligible) operates cash.
Some of it went to Hunt’s lawyer. His wife was taking money to a Cuban when her plane was shot down.”
Well, that's not entirely correct, Mr. Justice. Well, didn't he file a motion to quash the subpoenas in the district court of the United States? Sir, he has also taken a position that we have no standing in this court to have this issue heard.
As a matter of law, he's making that argument to a court. As a matter of constitutional law, he is correct. So that, of course, this court could then not pass upon the constitutional question of how he interprets the Constitution if his position were correct. As a matter of law, if his position is correct, then he is the sole judge.
He's asking this court to agree with that proposition as a matter of constitutional law. But what I'm saying is, if he is the sole judge, and if he's to be considered the sole judge, and he is in error in his interpretation, then he goes on being in error in his interpretation. Well, then this court will tell him so. That's what this case is about, isn't it?
Well, that's what I think the case is about, yes, sir. He's submitting himself to the judicial process in the same sense that you are. Is that not so? Well, I can't see it.
You take one position and he takes another. Well, Mr. Chief Justice, in my view, frankly, it is a position where he says the Constitution says this and nobody is going to tell me what the Constitution says. Because up to this point, up to this point, he says that he and he alone is a proper one to interpret the Constitution.
Now, there's no way to escape that because the briefs definitely point that out time after time. You're still saying the absolute privilege to decide what shall be released and what shall not be released is vested in one person, and nobody can question it. Insofar as it relates to the presidential conversation, that is correct, sir. The President is not above the law, by any means, but law as to the President has to be applied in a constitutional way, which is different than anyone else.
Namely, we suggest that he can only be impeached while in office, and cannot be indicted until such time as he no longer is in office.
In the performance of assigned constitutional duties, each branch of the government must initially interpret the Constitution, and the interpretation of its own powers by any one branch is due great respect from the others. The President's counsel reads the Constitution as providing an absolute privilege of confidentiality for all presidential communications. Many decisions of this Court, however, have unequivocally reaffirmed the holding of Marbury against Madison in 1803 that it is emphatically the province and the duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Our system of government requires that federal courts on occasion interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the construction given to that document by another branch.
Any other conclusion would be contrary to the basic concept of separation of powers and the checks and balances that flow from the scheme of a tripartite government. We therefore reaffirm what was said in Marbury against Madison, that it is emphatically the province and the duty of this Court to say what the law is with respect to a claim of privilege such as presented in this case. We conclude, therefore, that when the ground for asserting the privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based solely on the generalized interest in confidentiality, as distinguished from the situations where it may be based upon military secrets or diplomatic secrets, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice. The generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.
Accordingly, the judgment under review is affirmed. Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
Good evening. This is the 37th time I have spoken to you from this office, where so many decisions have been made that shaped the history of this nation. Each time I have done so to discuss with you some matter that I believe affected the national interest. In all the decisions I have made in my public life, I have always tried to do what was best for the nation.
Throughout the long and difficult period of Watergate, I have felt it was my duty to persevere, to make every possible effort to complete the term of office to which you elected me. In the past few days, however, it has become evident to me that I no longer have a strong enough political base in the Congress to justify continuing that effort. As long as there was such a base, I felt strongly that it was necessary to see the constitutional process through to its conclusion, that to do otherwise would be unfaithful to the spirit of that deliberately difficult process and a dangerously destabilizing precedent for the future. But with the disappearance of that base, I now believe that the constitutional purpose has been served and there is no longer a need for the process to be prolonged.
I would have preferred to carry through to the finish whatever the personal agony it would have involved, and my family unanimously urged me to do so. But the interests of the nation must always come before any personal considerations. From the discussions I have had with Congressional and other leaders, I have concluded that because of the Watergate matter, I might not have the support of the Congress that I would consider necessary to back the very difficult decisions and carry out the duties of this office in the way the interests of the nation will require. I have never been a quitter.
To leave office before my term is completed is abhorrent to every instinct in my body. But as President, I must put the interests of America first. America needs a full-time President and a full-time Congress, particularly at this time with problems we face at home and abroad. To continue to fight through the months ahead for my personal vindication would almost totally absorb the time and attention of both the President and the Congress in a period when our entire focus should be on the great issues of peace abroad and prosperity without inflation at home.
Therefore, I shall resign the presidency effective at noon tomorrow. Vice President Ford will be sworn in as President at that hour in this office. I regret deeply any injuries that may have been done in the course of the events that led to this decision. I would say only that if some of my judgments were wrong, and some were wrong, they were made in what I believed at the time to be the best interest of the nation.
To have served in this office is to have felt a very personal sense of kinship with each and every American. In leaving it, I do so with this prayer. May God's grace be with you in all the days ahead. If this is the kind of record you want to hear in full, subscribe and press like.
Those two things decide whether this reaches anyone who has not heard it.
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